We consider a growth model in which intergenerational transfers are made via stocks of private and public capital. Private capital is the outcome of individuals'private savings while decisions regarding public capital are made collectively. We hypothesize that private saving choices evolve through individual selection while public saving decisions are the result of group selection. The main result of the paper is that the equilibrium return to private capital is much more than twice as larger as the return to public capital if the two types of capital are complements. In other words, social choices involving intertemporal trade-o¤s exhibit much more patience than individual choices do.
decisions are made collectively; the social discount factor is more than twice as large as the private factor. This main result implies that, unlike Nordhaus (1994) suggests, the procedure of using data on individual consumption-saving behavior to implement social policies may be seriously ‡awed, even from a positive point of view. Individuals might welcome the implementation of social projects with vastly lower rates of return than they demand from private projects. However, unlike in Stern (2006) , the social discount rate predicted by our theory is signi…cantly larger than zero and is not pinned down by the probability of extinction of the human race.
Our speci…c model involves two di¤erent intertemporal trade-o¤s. One trade-o¤ is faced by the individual, while the other is decided collectively. These trade-o¤s are represented by two di¤erent capital stocks in the production function: one private and another public. Each individual chooses the amount he invests in private capital, but the contribution to public capital is identical for everyone and is selected collectively. Reproduction is sexual, and the return from saving is shared equally among o¤spring. If a couple has more combined savings, their children each receive more resources in the future, but the couple is left with fewer resources at present, and can only support a smaller family. In other words, consumption-saving decisions involve a quantity-quality trade-o¤ in terms of o¤spring.
We seek to characterize the saving preferences that arise from an evolutionary process. We hypothesize that individual choices evolve through individual selection, while collective decisions evolve through group selection. More speci…cally, private saving preferences must be evolutionary stable, that is, they must be resistant to invasion by rare mutants. Collective decisions must generate the largest possible population growth subject to the requirement that private saving decisions are evolutionarily stable.
Our main …nding is that the equilibrium gross return to public capital is less than half as large as the gross return to private capital. In other words, individuals are signi…cantly more patient with regard to collective decisions as compared to private ones. In order to understand why individuals are impatient in their private decision making, …rst consider the following key observation. In the context of sexual reproduction, rare mutants are only half-related to their children. Further, the most threatening rare mutants are those that maximize their growth rate when they have zero frequency in the population. Note that mutants also had the option to mimic the saving behavior of the original population, so rare mutants can always do at least as well. Hence, the only way to ensure that mutants cannot invade is for the saving behavior of the original population to match that of the most threatening mutants. That is, the general population must maximizes their growth rate as if their associated gene had zero frequency.
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This behavior distorts the quantity-quality trade-o¤ involving o¤spring when compared with asexual reproduction. Indeed, if reproduction were asexual, children and grandchildren would be of equal value. Therefore, the private saving decision which maximizes …tness equates the marginal return to saving measured in the number of grandchildren with the marginal return to consumption in terms of o¤spring. This saving decision turns out to be the one that maximizes population growth, resulting in biological e¢ ciency. However, if reproduction is sexual, children are more valuable to a parent than grandchildren because they are twice as related to the parent.
As a consequence, individuals prefer to sacri…ce some grandchildren by increasing the number of o¤spring at the cost of investing less in each child. Therefore, relative to the asexual case, couples have a preference for too many children, each of lower quality. Equivalently, private investment is made too impatiently. This induces a slower growth rate and fewer children in the equilibrium steady state. While the public saving decision is technologically analogous to the private investment, this decision is made collectively and must be followed by each member of the community. It evolves through group selection to maximize population growth, similar to the saving behavior that emerges in the asexual case. Therefore, this collective saving choice is guided by a lower rate of time preference. Indeed, the public decision involves still greater investment to partially, but not completely, o¤set the distortion created by insu¢ cient private investment. We intend our model to shed light on a variety of contexts, for example, the exhaustion of a depletable resource or pollution of the local environment. We introduce a speci…c growth model with two capital stocks and the steady state merely to facilitate the analysis. Our basic qualitative conclusions seem bound to hold in many models involving intertemporal trade-o¤s.
Related Literature
There is a small but steadily growing literature investigating the relationship between biology and economic behavior. Further, some of these papers examine how time preferences evolved through individual selection-see for example Rogers (1994) , Robson and Szentes (2008), and Robson et al. (2012) .
2 The basic conclusion of these papers is that the evolutionarily stable choice behavior can be represented by time-separable utility. The discount rate is the sum of the mortality rate and the population growth rate, and the overall utility function is reproductive value. Robson
and Samuelson (2009) shows that this conclusion crucially depends on the assumption that all the risk is idiosyncratic. They argue that if there is aggregate uncertainty the evolutionary stable behavior no longer has an expected utility representation. In all these papers, all the decisions are made at the individual level. Our primary goal here, in contrast, is to highlight a discrepancy between preferences for individual and collective choices.
There are also a few papers that consider macroeconomic phenomena in a biological context. and Stuart (1990) and Robson and Wooders (1997) , reproduction is asexual and all the choices are made collectively. In other words, they are similar to our model without the private capital.
Finally, there is a literature in macroeconomics which considers both private and public choicesfor example Perotti (1992 and 1993) , Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Milanovic (2000) . In these models, individuals are heterogenous in wealth and collective decisions are made regarding either income redistribution or public capital. (The aggregate production function in Alesina and Rodrik (1994) is essentially identical to ours.) The key assumption of these papers is that the collective decision is made by the median voter. The authors investigate the relationship between economic growth and income inequality. The typical conclusion of this literature is that signi…cant income inequality is harmful for economic development. 
The Model
Time is discrete and there is a continuum of individuals. 3 In each period, adult individuals are randomly matched, allocate resources to reproduction and capital investment, and die. The newborns become the adults of the next period, and the return on investment is then available. We next describe the technologies for production and reproduction.
There is a single aggregate output which is produced from public capital, M , private capital, K, and labor, L. The aggregate output available at time t + 1 is given by the function
where M t , K t and L t are the levels at time t of public capital, private capital, and labour, respectively. (More precisely, L t is the number of adults at time t.) For mathematical convenience, both types of capital are "circulating," so there is 100% depreciation.
We assume the production function G exhibits constant return-to-scale. De…ning m = M=L and k = K=L as per capita public and private capital, respectively, we then have
LG (m; k; 1) = Lg (m; k) ; say, where g (m; k) is per capita output. We assume that the function g is three times continuously di¤erentiable, satis…es Inada conditions in each input, is strictly concave, and has the inputs as complements.
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The number of o¤spring a couple has depends on their total consumption, where consumption is the residual resources left after investment. Suppose that one individual in a couple has resources w 1 and privately saves k 1 ; whereas the other has resources w 2 and saves k 2 . Then, if the per-capita public capital is …xed at m, they consume c 1 = w k 1 m and c 2 = w k 2 m, respectively.
The expected number of o¤spring of a couple then depends on c 1 + c 2 , and is given by 2f (c 1 + c 2 ).
The reproduction function f is continuously di¤erentiable, where f 0 (c) > 0; for all c 0; and f (0) = 0. We assume that each individual has access to the production technology g. Hence, if the parents invest k 1 and k 2 in private capital and the per-capita public capital is m then each of their o¤spring receive resources
We assume that choices regarding private saving evolve through individual selection while 3 Presumably, one half of the individuals are male and one half female. There is, however, no need for a formal distinction in the model between the sexes. 4 That is, more precisely:
the decisions regarding public capital are shaped by group selection. Consider many isolated communities, each of which is characterized by a per-capita level of public capital m. Private saving behavior is genetic; each o¤spring inherits the choice behavior of one of her parents with probability half. Private savings behavior is the result of individual selection if it is resistant to invasion by any mutant, so that no mutant can grow faster than the original community. Such behavior is an evolutionarily stable strategy, ESS, and we show that, for each m; there is a unique ESS denoted by k (m). Finally, a per-capita level of public capital m is the result of group selection if the community characterized by m grows faster than any other community subject to the constraint that the private saving is an ESS in every community. 6 More formally, we will identify the per-capita public capital m = m which is feasible and maximizes the population growth subject to the constraint that the private saving is k (m).
Results
We …rst characterize the biologically e¢ cient steady state saving decisions. That is, we identify the public and private capital levels which are feasible and which maximize the growth rate of the population. This serves as a benchmark and allows us to identify the biological ine¢ ciency due to individual selection.
Suppose that k, m and c are constant over time. For feasibility, the triple (m; k; c) has to satisfy the budget constraint that
where the left-hand-side is the inheritance of an o¤spring from her parents, as in (1), and the right-hand-side is the allocation of these resources to investments and consumption. Lemma 1 of the Appendix shows that each pair m; k 0 uniquely determines the feasible level of consumption, c(m; k) 0, say. If each couple has 2f (2c) o¤spring, the growth factor of this population is f (2c).
Since f is strictly increasing in c, the problem of maximizing the growth factor of the population is simply to
The key observation in the characterization of the solution to this is as follows. Replacing c by 6 The idea behind this concept is that larger groups displace smaller groups. This notion of "group selection"
is controversial for non-human species in general. It is less so here. In the …rst place, private capital is chosen in accordance with "individual selection." See Boyd and Richerson (1990) for the appeal of group selection in such circumstances. In the second place, humans are exceptional since culture makes it possible to ensure that individuals have the sel…sh incentives to produce rather arbitrary social outcomes. We rely on this argument to underly the choice of public capital.
One can explicitly model such a competition between groups by introducing a carrying capacity constraint, see for example Hansson and Stuart (1990) . This would entail induce a zero growth rate in equilibrium.
c (m; k) in Equation (2) and di¤erentiating both sides by m yields
If (m; k) induces the largest possible consumption then c m = 0, so the previous equation simpli…es to f (2c) = g m (m; k). An analogous argument shows that f (2c) = g k (m; k). We have:
Theorem 1 There is a unique pair m; k > 0 which induce the largest feasible consumption c > 0:
7 This pair is characterized by the …rst-order conditions
Proof. See the Appendix for a rigorous detailed proof.
These optimality conditions are familiar in that they equate the marginal product of each type of capital to the growth factor of population, f (2c). 8 The only "wrinkle"is that the growth factor of population is endogenous, indeed it is the objective to be maximized. In particular, the marginal returns from public and private capitals are equal.
We turn now to formulating the problem with sexual reproduction. For each m, we compute the unique steady state investment in private capital which is immune to invasion by a rare mutant.
Suppose that, in the candidate steady state equilibrium, each non-mutant adult allocates m to investment in public capital, k to private capital, leaving c to promote population growth. Consider then a rare mutant that must also allocate m to public capital, but allocates k to private capital, leaving c to promote growth.
Since mutants are rare, essentially all the matches involving mutants have one mutant and one non-mutant. We then calculate the maximum steady state growth factor for the mutants in this situation, so the mutant attains such steady state growth while remaining rare. The growth factor of the mutant population is f ( c + c): That is, each mutant-non-mutant couple has 2f ( c + c) o¤spring, one half of whom are mutants, on average. By (1), the budget constraint of a mutant is
Lemma 2 of the Appendix shows that, although there may exist values of k for which (3) cannot be satis…ed, there must be some values for which it can be satis…ed. The problem of maximizing the growth rate of the mutants is then: max c subject to 9k 2 R + such that (3) holds. 7 We abuse notation slightly by using m; k to denote the general values of these variables, as well as the speci…c optimal choices of them. 8 The assumption that all capital depreciates 100% means that that marginal product of capital must equal the growth factor, rather than just the growth rate.
Lemma 2 also shows that, when (3) can be satis…ed, there is a unique solution for c given by c (k). Proceeding informally, then, it follows from (3) that
If k generates the largest possible level of consumption, then c 0 (k) = 0, so the previous equation
To complete the informal argument, note that mutants match the growth rate of the original population if they invest k in private capital, but they maximize their growth rate by choosing k. So, unless k = k, the mutants can invade the original population. In short, k; c is an evolutionarily stable strategy, ESS, if and only if k = k and c = c: We have:
Theorem 2 For each m > 0; there exists a unique (pure strategy) ESS k; c which satis…es
Proof. Again, see the Appendix for a more rigorous proof.
The equilibrium condition determining k equates the marginal product of private capital to twice the population growth factor. Other things equal, then, the equilibrium choice of private capital would be much too low.
The e¤ect of sexual reproduction is to substantially increase impatience and therefore reduce investment in private capital. The mutants try then to have a larger number of o¤spring by reducing the income these o¤spring will have in the next period. The cost of this would be a reduced potential number of grandchildren. 10 However, in the steady state, since income falls, the ultimate e¤ect of the mutant is to reduce the number of children and the growth factor.
In a conceptual sense then the mutant is trading o¤ immediate rewards (children) against a delayed reward (grandchildren) and leaning too much in favor of the immediate reward. Sex then in this model is an underlying cause of too much impatience. Consider now how the optimal level of public capital, m, say, is determined by group selection.
Not only should the group choose on the basis of a lower and more appropriate rate of time discount, but the group should increase m still further in order to o¤set the deleterious e¤ect of too low a value of k. The optimal public capital maximizes the growth rate subject to the feasibility constraint and to private saving being determined as above by individual selection. Formally, m 9 We again abuse notation slightly by using m; k to denote the values of these variables that might arise in the general population, as well as the speci…c ESS values of them. 1 0 More precisely, what is reduced is the income available to children. This income can be used to produce new children, but also for investment to generate the income of the new children when they, in turn, become adults.
is the solution of the problem 11 max m c subject to f (2c) (m + k + c) = g(m; k) and g k (m; k) = 2f (2c).
Again, we content ourselves with an intuitive characterization of the solution, leaving a rigorous treatment to the Appendix. Suppose c (m) and k(m) satisfy the constraints, and di¤erentiate both sides of the …rst constraint with respect to m to get
If m maximizes c then c 0 ( m) = 0. Using the second constraint as well, we then have
It follows that k 0 ( m) > 0, since the two types of capitals are complements. We have:
Theorem 3 
Proof. See the Appendix.
That is, the marginal product of public capital is reduced below the population growth factor precisely because the marginal of private capital is above the population growth factor and increasing public capital increases the equilibrium level of private capital.
Discussion
Carrying Capacity-We have not explicitly modeled competition among groups. Instead, we simply assume that group selection generates collective choices that maximize population growth, with no explicit restriction on what this maximum rate might be. However, limited carrying capacity would force the equilibrium growth factor to be one (as in Hansson and Stuart (1990) ). After all, any appreciable growth rate of a few percent, if maintained for the 1.8 million years of our existence, would lead to the absurd result that we would have long since exhausted standing room on earth and are standing on one another's'shoulders, exploding into space at the speed of light.
This consideration renders puzzling anthropological data for modern hunter-gatherers with growth rates of even a few percent.
One attractive resolution of this is as follows. Suppose that these modern observations on growth are representative of past hunter-gatherer societies. However, suppose that these periods of tranquil growth are interrupted by the occasional disaster during which the population is drastically reduced. (In the simplest case, these disasters bear equally on all age classes.) There is no shortage of candidates for such disasters-ice-ages being only the best-known. 12 Robson and Samuelson (2009) establish results in a similar setting to this in which mortality rates are subject to aggregate shocks. Rates of time preference are then those appropriate to the tranquil periods of steady growth, with the catastrophes merely serving to lower growth to a plausible level. The bottom line is essentially that the present results can be taken as is, with no constraint set by a zero growth rate.
Cooperation-Parents here make their savings decisions simultaneously and non-cooperatively, and o¤spring are a public good, so it is not surprising that there is a free-rider problem. Indeed, there is undercontribution by each parent to the private capital that will generate income for each child. However, the issue is more subtle than this suggests. Undercontributing to the private Although the e¤ect of sex is to dilute one's concern with children by a factor of 1/2, the dilution of concern with grandchildren is even greater, involving a factor of 1/4. Hence sex creates a distortion from an attempt to favor the quantity of children over the quantity of grandchildren.
There are mechanisms that would address this distortion. Perhaps a biological solution would be to forge a pair bond between parents; there are also familiar game-theoretic mechanisms for inducing cooperation in repeated interactions. To the extent that these solutions are biological, the e¤ective change in preferences might be con…ned to settings involving children or might be imperfect anyway. To the extent that the solutions are game theoretic, they would work in the light of the inappropriate sel…sh preferences, and would not generate selection in favor of lower private rates of time preference. In either case, then, there would remain a divergence between private and public rates of time preference.
Global Warming-Finally, reconsider how this analysis might apply to the current debate about global warming. How might the current scenario concerning hunter-gatherers be translated to modern circumstances? We hypothesize that the private rate of time preference was, at least to some extent, hard-wired by evolution. We also hypothesize that public rates of time preference were sim-1 3 It is plausible that rates of time preference are also partly subject to enculturation, but this leads us still further from conventional economics. 1 4 Individuals may vote for public choices from a less-than-perfectly-sel…sh perspective. Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) present a model in which voters are motivated by ethical obligation. We extend this notion to time preference. 1 5 See Binmore (2005) for an argument that we should take evolution seriously as the foundation of our expressed ethical sense. 1 6 Key here is the advent of modern birth control.
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Further, there is only one solution to these …rst order conditions. It is straightforward to show that, for each m > 0 there exists a unique
Upon di¤erentiating the constraint twice and then setting c m (m; k) = c k (m; k) = 0; we obtain, dropping most arguments for simplicity,
Since g is strictly concave, g mm + 2g mk k 0 + g kk (k 0 ) 2 < 0: Recalling that g k = f (2c), it follows that c 00 < 0 at any solution of the …rst order conditions. But this implies there can only be one such solution, so there is a unique optimum as well.
Lemma 2 
